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
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CHAD-FRANCE: Tension Over Strategy

President Habre is eager to return to the offensive but is concerned about how France would react. [redacted]

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The US Embassy in N'Djamena says Habre fears that the French would refuse to support his troops if they attack and that they might even try to stop them. The Embassy reports that he may ask the US to intercede. [redacted]

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Comment: Habre may be in an increasingly risky position if the French see him as the major obstacle to arranging a long-term cease-fire and a negotiated settlement. So far he has been willing to discuss only a total withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad, including those in the Aozou Strip, conditions Tripoli will never accept. Paris is flexible and wants at all costs to prevent renewed conflict that could involve French troops. [redacted]

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The forces belonging to Habre's northern faction probably are pushing him to continue fighting and may become disenchanted with his leadership if he does not. These troops are Habre's most important power base, and they rapidly lose interest and discipline when not on the offensive. [redacted]

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Support for Habre among southern Chadians on the other hand, may begin to weaken if he is obdurate about negotiating. Many Chadians have supported Habre as the only alternative to a continuing civil war or a Libyan-backed regime in N'Djamena. With a strong French presence to help prevent further Libyan advances, interest in finding an alternative to Habre—or simply forcing him out—may grow. [redacted]

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The French could threaten to abandon Habre if he fails to go along with negotiations while promising to provide more military equipment and training to keep his troops occupied if he cooperates. Paris also could promise to provide additional budgetary support to help build up Habre's government. [redacted]

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Habre may believe that Paris has no alternative to his leadership. He also may be able to play on the fears of moderate Francophone African leaders to persuade them to urge France to continue its support for him and to preserve Chad's territorial integrity. [redacted]
[redacted]

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PAKISTAN: Violence Continuing

The opposition is continuing its antiregime agitation, but thus far it has failed to mount significant protests in Punjab, [redacted]

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The official death toll in Sind rose to 18 on Monday, following an exchange of fire between police and rioters who had looted an armory at Khairpur. More casualties occurred yesterday after police opened fire on protesters near Jacobabad. In the important city of Hyderabad, students joined in protests, forcing the most serious disturbance there so far. [redacted]

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The protests spread on Monday to Quetta, in Baluchistan Province, but demonstrations planned by the opposition in Punjab yesterday did not attract significant support. Although bazaar merchants in Lahore have rejected a call by the opposition for a general strike, lawyers there plan a boycott today. The main Sunni party and other conservative groups are waiting to see how the regime reacts before deciding to join the protests. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] The US Consulate General in Karachi reports the mood in Sind is becoming anti-Punjabi and could become increasingly separatist if the largely Punjabi Army is widely deployed in Sind. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, President Zia's Sindhi cabinet ministers have told him India and the USSR have helped finance the protests. [redacted]

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Comment: The situation in Sind is clearly of major concern to Islamabad, but Zia is holding back on any talks with opposition leaders to help reduce tensions. The protests almost certainly have made it impossible to hold local elections in Sind next month. Zia also could find it necessary to modify other parts of his plan to return the country to civilian rule. [redacted]

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If the violence is not controlled soon, or if it appears likely to spread to Punjab, the government probably will emphasize the charge of foreign involvement. Zia is improving relations with New Delhi, however, and he would be reluctant to single out India. One cabinet minister has already raised publicly the issue of foreign meddling—without naming a country. [redacted]

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NIGERIA-OAU-CHAD: Diplomatic Foot-Dragging

Nigerian Foreign Minister Audu has failed in his effort to persuade OAU chairman Mengistu to convene the organization's standing committee on Chad. Mengistu claims that a majority of the committee is favorable to Chadian President Habre and suggests that "other interested parties" should be invited to join it. According to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, however, Mengistu may be considering sending his own OAU delegation to Paris and Tripoli to urge them to disengage from Chad. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Mengistu is in no hurry to involve the OAU in reconciliation efforts on terms that may be disadvantageous to Chadian dissident leader Goukouni, whom he favors, and the Libyans. His refusal to move more quickly is a setback to Nigerian diplomacy. It also probably will irritate the French, who hope to disengage from Chad by pushing the Africans to take the lead in arranging a negotiated settlement. [REDACTED]

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POLAND: Underground Leader Surrenders

Senior underground leader Wladyslaw Hardek probably will be granted amnesty following his surrender yesterday to the authorities. He has stated on television that his conspiratorial activity had caused great material and moral losses and called on other members of the underground to cease their activity.

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Comment: Hardek's defection is a victory for the authorities and will lower morale in the dispirited underground. It also will sow confusion among workers, particularly in the Krakow region, who were considering staging demonstrations next week during the commemoration of Solidarity's third anniversary. Hardek's move could induce lower level activists to accept the offer of amnesty, which expires at the end of October.

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Special Analysis

EL SALVADOR: Problems for the Insurgents

Continuing government offensives are reducing the guerrillas' chances of regaining the military initiative. Nevertheless, the insurgents appear determined to launch their own offensive soon to strengthen their credibility at home and abroad. [redacted]

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The insurgents still plan to begin a large offensive soon, but government operations in most areas of former guerrilla strength apparently are hampering efforts by the insurgents to regroup and coordinate actions. According to reports from the US defense attache and other information, the constant forced movement of insurgent units is causing spot shortages of ammunition and other supplies.

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The Army's growing resolve to attack the insurgents was reflected by its willingness to forgo a traditional holiday week earlier this month.

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A decrease of 60 percent in the Army casualty rate for July as compared with the preceding three months is likely to reinforce support in the officer corps for the aggressive strategy of Defense Minister Vides. His popularity appears to have been strengthened by recent visits to frontline units.

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The sustained Army operations are enabling accompanying civic action programs to spread faster than originally envisioned, according to US Embassy reporting. All municipalities in San Vicente Department reportedly have been secured, numerous schools reopened, new roadbuilding projects started, and more than 1,200 people vaccinated at refurbished health centers. Government officials anticipate initiating similar programs in Usulután Department later this month following clearing operations.

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Increasing Insurgent Problems

The guerrillas' failure so far to disrupt the Army's offensive underscores internal weaknesses among them that previously were obscured by their tactical successes. The dilemma over how to respond to the offer by the government to hold negotiations probably has revived longstanding differences over political-military strategy among the various guerrilla factions.

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In addition, the decision not to contest most Army advances indicates the insurgents still cannot muster superior forces in many base areas, thereby requiring them to continue their traditional tactics of avoiding large-scale combat. []

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The progress of the civic action program may eventually undercut the popularity of the insurgents in many of their former rural strongholds. The guerrillas also face the task of rebuilding their mass organizations in the cities. According to recent reports, many insurgent leaders have set aside their hopes for a popular insurrection to sweep them into power. []

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The guerrillas' concern over their standing among the people also is reflected in their preoccupation with the presidential election, which is now likely to be held in early 1984. They fear another mass repudiation similar to the Constituent Assembly election in March 1982. As a result, they are already increasing antielection propaganda at home as well as in Western Europe, where they reportedly see their support diminishing. []

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Pressures in Central America

Regional trends appear equally unfavorable for the guerrillas. Their sponsors in Havana and Managua are facing growing difficulties trying to support operations in El Salvador while simultaneously fighting anti-Sandinista insurgents in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas are under pressure from other countries in the region to negotiate an overall peace agreement. []

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Recent reporting indicates that Cuba and Nicaragua may be finding it increasingly difficult to resupply the Salvadoran guerrillas, who still depend heavily on them for support. Some guerrilla units have complained that they are not receiving enough arms and ammunition and that the quality is often poor. The insurgents' anxiety is likely to intensify, following recent indications by Managua and Havana that their support for the insurgency in El Salvador is negotiable. []

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The guerrillas presumably are aware that the Salvadoran armed forces are getting increasing support from Honduras and other countries in the region. Salvadoran units are to be trained at a new base in Honduras, and the new government in Guatemala also reportedly is showing interest in coordinating security operations with San Salvador. []

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Outlook

The insurgents are aware of the need to launch another major offensive soon to strengthen their credibility as a fighting force and improve their negotiating position. Their major problem may be trying to coordinate simultaneous operations on several fronts at a time when the government holds the initiative. The scope and scale of the anticipated insurgent offensive will be an important indication of how badly the guerrillas have been hurt in recent months. [redacted]

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Despite a lack of initiative, the insurgents are still strong militarily in the east and the north. Their overall personnel and equipment losses have not been heavy in the past several months, and their estimated strength remains between 8,000 and 12,000 men, including regular units and militia forces. [redacted]
they are continuing to distribute supplies among their base areas in preparation for a new offensive. [redacted]

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